August 13th, 2024

NIST Announces Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards

The U.S. NIST has standardized three post-quantum cryptography schemes to protect against quantum computer vulnerabilities, with a fourth expected in 2024, emphasizing urgent and complex transition needs for data security.

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NIST Announces Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards

The U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has announced the standardization of three post-quantum cryptography (PQC) encryption schemes, with a fourth expected in late 2024. These standards aim to address the potential vulnerabilities posed by future quantum computers to current encryption methods like RSA, which relies on the difficulty of factoring large numbers. The newly standardized algorithms, known as Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) 203, 204, and 205, are based on lattice cryptography and hash functions, designed to secure data against quantum attacks. NIST emphasizes the urgency of transitioning to these standards, as many devices using RSA will remain in use for at least a decade. The transition process is expected to be complex and costly, with industry experts advocating for immediate implementation to mitigate risks associated with the "harvest now, decrypt later" threat. NIST's selection process for these algorithms involved a public competition that began in 2016, receiving 82 submissions from around the world. Despite concerns raised about the security of lattice cryptography, recent evaluations reaffirm its robustness against quantum threats. The transition to these new standards is crucial for future-proofing data security in an increasingly digital world.

- NIST has standardized three post-quantum cryptography schemes, with a fourth on the way.

- The new standards aim to protect against potential vulnerabilities from quantum computers.

- Transitioning to these standards is complex and will require significant time and resources.

- The algorithms were selected through a public competition involving global submissions.

- Recent evaluations confirm the security of lattice cryptography against quantum attacks.

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By @tromp - 6 months
Old standards like RSA and ECDSA re based on the presumed classical hardness of the discrete log / hiddden subgroup problem, which is known to be quantum easy. New ones are based on lattice shortest vector problems, which are presumed to be both classical and quantum hard. But there's a risk that they turn out to be easy for both.

Is there support in the standards for combining the strength of old and new methods, so that successful attacks requires breaking both types of problems?

By @mbStavola - 6 months
Kyber was a great name, a bit sad we can't preserve a little bit of fun in standardization. FIPS 203 just doesn't hit the same!
By @nabla9 - 6 months
For maximum post-quantum security KEM Classic McEliece has the strongest security track record.

https://mceliece.org/

https://classic.mceliece.org/

The large key size may be a problem for some uses.

By @lvh - 6 months
We did an updated version of the Cryptographic Right Answers for PQC. Given how quick the field is moving, I'm sure we're going to have to edit it a bunch :)

https://www.latacora.com/blog/2024/07/29/crypto-right-answer...

By @benreesman - 6 months
I have no idea how one person could have this much sophistication in their evening/weekend work on their dots: but for an example of some hard core BQP as daily driver:

https://github.com/xddxdd

By @bayindirh - 6 months
I wonder whether we will find (un)intentional weak points in these algorithms down the road, too.

After reading Crypto AG scandal, I can't trust anyone easily.

By @feverzsj - 6 months
With post-quantum back doors?
By @modeless - 6 months
How are people supposed to choose which one of the four to use?
By @udev4096 - 6 months
Is ed25519 resistant to quantum computers?
By @bongodongobob - 6 months
Looking forward to our security team wanting to implement this to justify their usefulness.