August 17th, 2024

Summary of the USA federal government's zero-trust memo

The U.S. government's Zero Trust Cybersecurity Memo promotes enhanced federal cybersecurity by advocating dynamic authentication methods, eliminating long-lived credentials, mandating encryption, and encouraging bug bounty programs for vulnerabilities.

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Summary of the USA federal government's zero-trust memo

The U.S. government's recent Zero Trust Cybersecurity Memo, released by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), aims to enhance federal cybersecurity in response to significant incidents like the SolarWinds breach and the Colonial Pipeline ransomware attack. The memo outlines a shift towards a Zero Trust model, emphasizing the need for agencies to adopt modern authentication methods, including Single Sign-On (SSO) and Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) that are dynamic and fine-grained. It discourages reliance on long-lived credentials and traditional VPNs, advocating for application-level authentication instead. The memo also calls for the elimination of SMS-based MFA and the use of phishing-resistant tokens. Additionally, it mandates the encryption of both internal and DNS traffic, and encourages agencies to implement bug bounty programs for vulnerability disclosures. Overall, the memo sets a high standard for cybersecurity practices, pushing for a more robust posture that could influence private sector practices as well.

- The U.S. government is adopting a Zero Trust cybersecurity model to enhance security.

- Agencies are encouraged to use dynamic MFA and eliminate long-lived credentials.

- Traditional VPNs are being phased out in favor of application-level authentication.

- The memo mandates encryption of internal and DNS traffic.

- Bug bounty programs are recommended to improve vulnerability disclosure processes.

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Link Icon 7 comments
By @tptacek - 6 months
We interviewed Eric Mill, one of the authors of the memo, a couple years back, getting into the details of what exactly the memo meant about VPNs, about encrypted email (it's not what you think it means) and about encrypted DNS:

https://securitycryptographywhatever.com/2022/06/10/omb-zero...

I think for HN the most important thing you can keep in your head about the OMB ZT memo is that vendors jumped on it like the Bumpus hounds to the Parker family Christmas turkey, so there are a lot of ZT takes that more or less condense to "our product is now rated M for Mandatory".

By @zamalek - 6 months
> This seems very feasible in the context of a government agency, because each employee can receive her token as part of her onboarding when she is hired. However, this sort of thing is harder to do if you are a SaaS service

It's not. Allow SMS to be disabled in favor of a more secure option (WebAuthn). Strongly suggest that users purchase a token.

By @y-curious - 6 months
None of this is new to me, unfortunately. Going through getting FedRAMP High for my company and there are a lot of hoops to jump through. 80% of it is very reasonable e.g. DNSSEC, Hardware MFA. 20% of it is theater: You cannot, for example, allow AWS Govcloud to handle SSL termination for ECS. You have to manually verify S3 replication and cannot rely on their logging.

Still, echoing other commenters' sentiments, it's nice to see the government being forward-thinking on this. Jury is still out for NIST to weigh in on post-quantum encryption.

By @dataflow - 6 months
A lot of good stuff in the recommendations, but I find this one questionable:

> “Enterprise applications should be able to be used over the public internet.”

This is straight up arguing against defense-in-depth, and getting rid of connection auditing and interception capability. Seems extremely dubious, unless by "be able to" they mean "it should be OK security-wise if you get rid of the VPN" and not "you should actually get rid of the VPN".

By @ProllyInfamous - 6 months
>No longer use phone/text codes for 2FA

Hopefully my bank implements this recommendation ASAP... I haven't had access to online banking in the two years since they've required phone/text to log in, but are incompatible with my YubiKey (which is phish-resistant).

I have complained for two years to them, visiting a physical teller every time I need an account inquiry.

By @joshmarinacci - 6 months
Surprisingly forward looking for the US government