Safer C++
Alex Gaynor advocates transitioning from C/C++ to memory-safe languages in security-critical contexts, proposing improvements in C++ safety through bounds checking, smart pointers, and a dual strategy for teams.
Read original articleAlex Gaynor advocates for transitioning from memory-unsafe languages like C and C++ to memory-safe alternatives in security-critical contexts. He acknowledges the challenges of migrating extensive C++ codebases but emphasizes the importance of improving C++ safety in the interim. Gaynor discusses various proposals to enhance C++ safety, focusing on spatial safety, uninitialized memory, temporal safety, and data races. He suggests that the C++ standards committee could implement bounds checking for STL containers and adopt features like -fbounds-safety for raw pointers, which would significantly reduce buffer overflow vulnerabilities. Additionally, he highlights the need for better handling of uninitialized memory and proposes the use of smart pointers to clarify ownership and mitigate use-after-free vulnerabilities. However, he notes that existing proposals for lifetime semantics are limited and may not cover all ownership scenarios. Gaynor concludes that while substantial safety improvements for C++ are achievable, making it as safe as languages like Rust or Swift remains a complex challenge. He recommends that engineering and security teams adopt a dual strategy: investing in C++ safety improvements while also considering migration to safer languages.
- Alex Gaynor advocates for moving from C/C++ to memory-safe languages in security contexts.
- Proposals for improving C++ safety include bounds checking and better handling of uninitialized memory.
- Smart pointers can help mitigate use-after-free vulnerabilities, but existing lifetime proposals are limited.
- Achieving C++ safety comparable to Rust or Swift is complex and may require significant effort.
- A dual strategy of enhancing C++ safety and migrating to safer languages is recommended for security teams.
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