September 10th, 2024

Pixhell Attack: Leaking Info from Air-Gap Computers via 'Singing Pixels'

The PIXHELL attack enables data leakage from air-gapped computers by using screen-generated sound, transmitting sensitive information over 2 meters while employing evasion techniques and suggesting countermeasures for protection.

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Pixhell Attack: Leaking Info from Air-Gap Computers via 'Singing Pixels'

The PIXHELL attack, presented by Mordechai Guri, reveals a new method for leaking sensitive information from air-gapped computers without the need for audio hardware. Traditionally, air-gapped systems are isolated from networks to protect sensitive data, but attackers can exploit sound from speakers to exfiltrate information. The PIXHELL attack circumvents this by using the noise generated by the pixels on a screen, allowing malware to create specific pixel patterns that emit sound frequencies between 0 and 22 kHz. This method utilizes the electromagnetic noise produced by the screen's components, enabling the transmission of sensitive data over distances of up to 2 meters. The paper discusses the attack model, technical background, and implementation details, including bitmap generation and the modulation/demodulation process. It also addresses evasion techniques, such as using low-brightness patterns that resemble turned-off screens, and proposes countermeasures to mitigate this threat. The findings highlight the vulnerabilities of air-gapped and audio-gapped systems, emphasizing the need for enhanced security measures.

- The PIXHELL attack leaks data from air-gapped computers using screen-generated sound.

- It operates without audio hardware, exploiting electromagnetic noise from screen components.

- Sensitive information can be transmitted over distances of up to 2 meters.

- The attack employs low-brightness patterns to evade detection.

- Countermeasures are proposed to protect against this type of data exfiltration.

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By @exabrial - 7 months
My uncle described the air gapped facility he worked in… when they said no EM out, they meant nothing in or out except humans and filtered air. It was behind dual interlocking nuclear blast doors and concrete. Even the water was sourced and recycled on site to prevent documents or capsules exfiltration via the sewer.
By @metaphor - 7 months
For those unindoctrinated with the underlying phenomenon being exploited, this demo[1] was shared almost a decade ago.

Also, undiscussed mitigation techniques[2] relevant to this general class of nuisance that circuit designers may find of value.

[1] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=8862689

[2] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=41505772

By @PoignardAzur - 7 months
Two meters seems like a pretty short distance to bypass an airgap.

At that point, in the kind of situation where someone is actively trying to exfiltrate data, couldn't they point their phone camera at a screen?

Like, maybe there are scenarios where the exit device is compromised without the wearer knowing, or the spy wants to remain discrete, but they seem a bit niche.

By @Terr_ - 7 months
In some alternate timeline, there's yet another attack vector of noise from still-in-use floppy drives. (In addition to other less-obsoleted things like flatbed scanners.)

Much the same way that people have used them to make music.

https://www.theverge.com/24034551/floppy-disk-music-scene-un...

By @forgetm3 - 7 months
This author appears to be quite focused on side channel attacks against various computer components. It appears nearly all of his 32 publications are regarding side channel attacks.

https://arxiv.org/search/cs?searchtype=author&query=Guri,+M

By @scrps - 7 months
TEMPEST met Funtenna and had a baby!
By @cwillu - 7 months
See also: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=32139827

This is really just publication spam.