October 25th, 2024

Law Enforcement Undermines Tor

Law enforcement in Germany has infiltrated the Tor network to deanonymize users, raising legal concerns. Monitoring by Telefónica and timing analysis have compromised Tor's effectiveness as an anonymization tool.

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Law Enforcement Undermines Tor

Recent reports indicate that law enforcement agencies, particularly in Germany, have successfully infiltrated the Tor network to deanonymize users involved in criminal activities. Documents reviewed by journalists reveal that the German Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) ordered Telefónica (O2) to monitor customers connecting to specific Tor entry relays, a process referred to as IP catching. This surveillance lasted for up to three months, although Telefónica claimed that data from unsuspecting users was deleted immediately. The legality of this measure is questionable, as no clear legal basis was provided. The Tor Project acknowledged that deanonymization was achieved through timing analysis rather than exploiting software vulnerabilities, suggesting that the attack could occur even when the Tor software functions correctly. Reports indicate a significant increase in the monitoring of Tor relays in Germany, with multiple successful deanonymizations documented in various investigations, including Operation Liberty Lane. The implications of these findings raise concerns about the effectiveness of Tor as an anonymization tool, particularly for users of onion services and whistleblowing platforms, where low traffic can facilitate deanonymization.

- Law enforcement agencies have infiltrated the Tor network to expose criminals.

- Telefónica was ordered to monitor Tor users, raising legal and ethical concerns.

- Deanonymization was achieved through timing analysis, not software vulnerabilities.

- The number of monitored Tor relays in Germany has significantly increased.

- The effectiveness of Tor as an anonymization tool is under scrutiny.

Link Icon 14 comments
By @dang - 3 months
Recent, related, and cited:

Is Tor still safe to use? - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=41583847 - Sept 2024 (562 comments)

By @cedws - 3 months
I have suspected Tor has been busted for quite a long time. LE is only using this power selectively for now - the last thing that they want is to scare users away lest they go and build something more secure.

The Nym mixnet[0] seems promising but it's still new and unproven.

I had an idea a while back to make traffic analysis more difficult by building circuits distributed across adversarial countries. Would like to hear thoughts on it.[1]

[0]: https://nymtech.net/about/mixnet

[1]: https://cedwards.xyz/adversarial-routing/

By @j-bos - 3 months
One advantage of imperfect privacy solutions like Tor is they force authorities to invest if they want to snoop. In the before times if soneone wanted to read your mail they'd need to at least convince a judge and then spend manpower interecepting the envelopes, today they can just ping google for a bcc.
By @rustcleaner - 3 months
The dark network of the future will be an onion-routed Hyphanet/Freenet, with monthly "bandwidth quotas" that make links communicate uniformly at X GB/hr regardless of traffic (padding when there is none) until the monthly quota is hit right at the end of the month. If internodal links don't vary in externally measurable ways when utilized, netflow is diminished.
By @sandworm101 - 3 months
Time for nodes to inject some random traffic. It sounds like if even 0.1% was random fluff they would not be able to track packets between nodes.
By @jagged-chisel - 3 months
Is there something new here? I’m under the impression that we knew this kind of thing was possible with enough resources.
By @dialup_sounds - 3 months
It's not directly mentioned in this article, but the four deanonymized users were admins of a CSAM site with hundreds of thousands of users. If you're concerned about being targeted by law enforcement, step one is probably: don't be that.

https://www.dw.com/de/darknet-missbrauchsplattform-boystown-...

https://www.sueddeutsche.de/panorama/kindesmissbrauch-boysto...

By @bananamango - 3 months
Split EntryGuard should help, means you connect to multiple of them instead of one, and your data is split between them then it gets to Exit through multiple paths (Middle Nodes) and there it is reconstructed to one data stream. How about that?
By @bananamango - 3 months
Connecting through multiple EntryGuards should help in this situation, Tor should split data transfer to many smaller ones travelling through different paths (Entry+Midddle) and then get it reconstructed to one stream at ExitNode.
By @ementally - 3 months
Are there any projects that generates random traffic? Like a website where you have it open it keeps sending random traffic. It will make traffic analysis very hard.
By @radku - 3 months
Would using VPN prevent prying eyes from detecting the IP address? This issue seems to be related only to Tor users who do not use VPN?