October 26th, 2024

New Windows Driver Signature bypass allows kernel rootkit installs

A new vulnerability allows attackers to bypass Windows Driver Signature Enforcement, downgrading kernel components on patched systems. The Windows Downdate tool facilitates this, highlighting the need for improved endpoint security.

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New Windows Driver Signature bypass allows kernel rootkit installs

A new vulnerability has been discovered that allows attackers to bypass Windows Driver Signature Enforcement (DSE) and install kernel rootkits on fully patched systems. This is achieved by manipulating the Windows Update process to downgrade critical kernel components, such as the 'ci.dll' file, which is responsible for enforcing driver signatures. The researcher Alon Leviev demonstrated this exploit at security conferences, revealing that even updated systems can be made susceptible to previously patched vulnerabilities. Microsoft has acknowledged the issue but claims it does not cross a defined security boundary. Leviev's tool, Windows Downdate, enables the creation of custom downgrades, effectively rendering the term "fully patched" meaningless. The attack exploits a "race window" condition during the update process, allowing outdated components to load while the system believes it is using the latest versions. Additionally, the research highlights potential methods to disable Microsoft's Virtualization-based Security (VBS), which is designed to protect critical system resources. Leviev emphasizes the need for enhanced endpoint security measures to monitor downgrade procedures, as these attacks can occur even without crossing major security boundaries.

- A new method allows attackers to bypass Windows Driver Signature Enforcement.

- The exploit can downgrade kernel components, making patched systems vulnerable.

- The Windows Downdate tool facilitates the creation of custom downgrades.

- The attack exploits a timing issue during the Windows Update process.

- Enhanced endpoint security is necessary to monitor and prevent downgrade attacks.

AI: What people are saying
The comments reflect a mix of skepticism and concern regarding the new Windows vulnerability and its implications for security.
  • Many users question the effectiveness of Microsoft's security measures, particularly regarding UAC and driver signing enforcement.
  • There is a general sentiment that Windows is perceived as more vulnerable to attacks compared to other operating systems.
  • Some commenters express frustration over the complexity and resources required for compliance with Microsoft's security protocols.
  • Several users highlight the simplicity of the attack method, suggesting it points to deeper design flaws in the OS.
  • There are mixed feelings about the implications of the vulnerability, with some seeing potential for misuse while others note possible benefits in bypassing restrictions.
Link Icon 12 comments
By @fullspectrumdev - 4 months
So what’s interesting is MS say that UAC isn’t a security boundary. Which is some users to admin.

Then they say admin to kernel (in this case) isn’t a security boundary.

While also saying that driver signing enforcement is a security feature.

Which is what’s being bypassed here.

But they claim in this case it’s not crossing a security boundary.

Please make sense.

By @quotemstr - 4 months
It's also interesting how on both Windows and Linux normal-privilege local accounts are, practically, root equivalent. In Linux, we train people to type "sudo" in front of anything system relevant. On Windows, we train users to click through UAC prompts. When was the last time sudo said "no" to somebody for a reason other than a password typo?

(UAC is marginally better than sudo: UAC is system managed UI, while sudo is just a program. An attacker can plug in a malicious shell alias for sudo and steal your password.)

IMHO, it'd be more convenient for users and more reflective of actual security posture to get rid of both sudo and UAC (in the default setup of course) and stop pretending that there's a firm security boundary between root and the primary human local user account.

By @quotemstr - 4 months
So the kernel is enforcing file sharing rules (mandatory locking, in effect) by scanning on open all open file handles for conflicting mandatory locks, but doesn't check for memory mappings of these files with conflicting permissions. Oops. Seems like a straightforward fix though.

It's worth noting that Linux just got rid of its last vestige of mandatory locking. Now you can write a loaded executable without getting EBUSY. Interesting how exactly the same feature on one OS can be a load bearing part of the security infrastructure and on another OS legacy crud to be deleted.

By @tomrod - 4 months
I'm not by any means a security guru. I understand some basics, but I think I'm missing a conceptual model somewhere. What is it about Windows that makes it so damn hackable?
By @thrtythreeforty - 4 months
I'm kind of with Microsoft on this one: the administrator can do arbitrary things to the computer, film at 11. Is there a nuance that I'm missing that raises the severity of this?

See also Raymond Chen's summary of this class of attack:

https://devblogs.microsoft.com/oldnewthing/20060508-22/?p=31...

By @ajross - 4 months
Seems like the attack is suspiciously simple: Fool the update process into installing old versions of kernel components with known vulnerabilities. I'm no expert, but surely MS has already thought about this and has a blacklist or revocation facility or whatever?

Is the root cause here an OS design issue or just a process failure where they failed to note the broken/bad hashes in the correct spot? The latter is much easier to fix, but the (slightly spun, as always) security announcement seems to claim the former.

By @the_arun - 4 months
Hard to believe Microsoft is disagreeing when there is a demo.

In that Vimeo account there are ton of other security discoveries. Eg WhatsApp running python script. Is this real or scam?

By @wslh - 4 months
Wow! I remember the hard time we all had at [1] (doing deep packet inspection drivers for [2]). when Microsoft first required driver signing in Windows. The workflow seemed, at first glance, even tougher than getting an app approved on the Apple Store, with documentation that was far from clear. Personally, this feels like a huge setback considering the resources companies have poured into complying with Microsoft’s requirements, only to see it exploited in this way. Of course, vulnerabilities are always out there, but it would have been reassuring if someone had uncovered this one earlier. Kudos to Alon Leviev and SafeBreach for discovering it.

[1] https://www.nektra.com/

[2] https://www.verizon.com/business/en-nl/products/security/man...

By @bubblesnort - 4 months

    > possible by gaining kernel code execution as an administrator
The root user can install rootkits as usual. Don't forget to brand it a cool name.... Oh wait:

    > The researcher published a tool called Windows Downdate
There you go, here's your 0xF minutes of fame, well played.
By @de6u99er - 4 months
When I have to use Windows I always assume the computer has been compromised.
By @TheRealPomax - 4 months
it also allows tampering with Windows 11 to actually make it a better OS because it bypasses all the Microsoft lockdown bullshit, but let's focus on the rootkits instead.
By @mrinfinitiesx - 4 months
The owner of this website (www.bleepingcomputer.com) has banned your IP address (IP)

K.

edit: VPN, ssh -D to vps & socks5 localhost worked. Can't have anything anymore.