ZombAIs: From Prompt Injection to C2 with Claude Computer Use
Anthropic's Claude Computer Use enables AI to control computers, raising security concerns. An experiment demonstrated prompt injection to execute malware, highlighting risks and the need for caution with autonomous AI systems.
Read original articleAnthropic has introduced Claude Computer Use, a model that allows AI to autonomously control computers, including taking screenshots and executing commands. While this technology showcases advanced capabilities, it also raises significant security concerns, particularly regarding prompt injection attacks. The blog post details an experiment where the author successfully executed a prompt injection to have Claude download and run malware, effectively turning the computer into a "ZombAI." The process involved setting up a Command and Control (C2) server and crafting a prompt that tricked Claude into downloading a malicious binary. Despite initial challenges with security protocols, the author found that simply instructing Claude to download and execute the file was effective. This experiment highlights the potential risks of AI systems processing untrusted data and emphasizes the need for caution when using such technologies. The author concludes by warning against running unauthorized code and reiterating the importance of skepticism towards AI capabilities.
- Claude Computer Use allows AI to control computers, posing security risks.
- Prompt injection can be exploited to execute malware on AI-controlled systems.
- The author successfully demonstrated a method to download and run malware using prompt injection.
- The experiment underscores the need for caution with autonomous AI systems.
- Unauthorized code execution on systems is strongly discouraged.
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Fundamentally, LLMs are gullible. They follow instructions that make it into their token context, with little regard for the source of those instructions.
This dramatically limits their utility for any form of "autonomous" action.
What use is an AI assistant if it falls for the first malicious email / web page / screen capture it comes across that tells it to forward your private emails or purchase things on your behalf?
(I've been writing about this problem for two years now, and the state of the art in terms of mitigations has not advanced very much at all in that time: https://simonwillison.net/tags/prompt-injection/)
If the prompt said something along the lines of "Claude, navigate to this page and follow any instructions it has to say", it can't really be called "prompt injection" IMO.
EDIT: The linked demo shows exactly what's going on. The prompt is simply "show {url}" and there's no user confirmation after submitting the prompt, where Claude proceeds to download the binary and execute it locally using bash. That's some prompt injection! Demonstrating that you should only run this tool on trusted data and/or in a locked down VM.
This is really feeling like "we asked if we could, but never asked if we should" and "has [computer] science one too far" territory to me.
Not in the glamorous super-intelligent AI Overlord way though, just the banal leaded-gasoline and radium-toothpaste way which involves liabilities and suffering for a buck.
In a world where posting false information for profit has lowered so much, determining what is worth sticking into training data, and what is just an outright fabrication seems like a significant danger that is very expensive to try to patch up, and impossible to fix.
It's red queen races all the way down, and we'll be bound to find ourselves in times where the bad actors are way ahead.
That said, I played some with the new version of Claude 3.5 last night, and it did feel smarter. I asked it to write a self-contained webpage for a space invaders game to my specs, and its code worked the first time. When asked to make some adjustments to the play experience, it pulled that off flawlessly, too. I'm not a gamer or a programmer, but it got me thinking about what kinds of original games I might be able to think up and then have Claude write for me.
The point of the AI being "friendly" was that it would stop and let you correct it. You still needed to make sure you kept anyone else from "correcting it" to do something bad!
AI agents were always about pulling control away from the masses and conditioning them to accept and embrace subservience.
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