December 29th, 2024

Breaking NATO Radio Encryption [video]

HALFLOOP-24 encryption, used by NATO and the US military, has vulnerabilities allowing key recovery in two hours, compromising communication security and highlighting the need for improved encryption standards.

Read original articleLink Icon
Breaking NATO Radio Encryption [video]

A recent presentation at the 38th Chaos Communication Congress (38c3) highlighted significant vulnerabilities in the HALFLOOP-24 encryption algorithm, which is utilized by NATO and the US military for high-frequency radio communications. The research indicates that an attacker can recover the secret key with just two hours of intercepted radio traffic, undermining the security of the automatic link establishment (ALE) protocol. HALFLOOP-24, standardized in 2017, was designed to enhance the security of ALE frames, which protect against unauthorized access and traffic analysis. However, flaws in the algorithm's handling of tweaks allow for differential cryptanalysis, enabling attackers to bypass substantial portions of the encryption process. This vulnerability not only compromises the confidentiality of ALE handshake messages but also facilitates denial-of-service attacks. The findings are detailed in two research papers titled "Breaking HALFLOOP-24" and "Destroying HALFLOOP-24," which build upon earlier work on the SoDark cipher, the predecessor to HALFLOOP. The implications of these vulnerabilities raise concerns about the security of military communications and the need for more robust encryption standards.

- HALFLOOP-24 encryption used by NATO and the US military has critical vulnerabilities.

- An attacker can recover the secret key with only two hours of intercepted traffic.

- The algorithm's flaws allow for differential cryptanalysis, compromising communication security.

- The findings are documented in two research papers that build on previous work on the SoDark cipher.

- The vulnerabilities highlight the need for improved encryption standards in military communications.

Link Icon 10 comments
By @ryao - 4 months
Why did the NSA not report this flaw to NATO before this became a standard? The NSA had differential cryptanalysis before anyone else. It is odd that they did not catch/report the problem.
By @ugjka - 4 months
So you need 2 hours of both encrypted and unencrypted data at same time to make this attack work, is this feasible? And if you just flip the switch on devices to use more bits in the encryption the attack becomes unfeasible. Piss poor that NATO never replied to them.
By @0_____0 - 4 months
For those without a free hour to watch, here's the slide deck?

I am not a cryptography or digital radio expert, so grain of salt and all that.

Slide 14 shows real world feasibility, I think it's safe to say that while theoretically possible it's unlikely that this creates a significant real world issue. One bit of info I don't know - how long is a set of exchanged keys used for in most situations?

https://tosc.iacr.org/index.php/ToSC/article/view/9856/11598

By @adamtaylor_13 - 4 months
What are all these ccc.de links getting posted recently? Was there some sort of hacker convention?
By @SpaghettiCthulu - 4 months
Sounds like this isn't anything new? The cited papers are from 2021, 2022, and 2023.
By @flanifan - 4 months
video no longer available.
By @anilakar - 4 months
Uhh, Charlie as the eavesdropper instead of Eve. Please do not reinvent industry standard terms.
By @kensai - 4 months
Let’s hope Putin does not watch this space!