NASA acknowledges it cannot quantify risk of Starliner propulsion issues

FWIW, a nice comment[1] from forum.nasaspaceflight.com (no affiliation with NASA):

> I'm retired now but did propulsion and systems engineering on the Transfer Orbit Stage (TOS) developed by Orbital Sciences and Lockheed Martin for NASA/MSFC in the 1990's. [...] I'll make a few comments on how/where things might have gone off the rails with the RCS thruster thermal problem.

[1] https://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/index.php?topic=60593.msg2...

I'm more upset at NASA than Boeing over this for downplaying this issue for months while doing very serious things in the background like hot fire testing. Not transparent at all. You can easily see how public perception thought everything was fine all through July here:

https://manifold.markets/Shihan/will-spacex-dragon-rescue-bo...

I'd love an investigation to see if the public perception matched NASA's perception. I would be money that it doesn't which means NASA has been hiding the truth from the public. How can anyone trust what NASA says after this?

Curious as to moral in the Boeing division right now. If you designed/built/influenced any part of the design and watching this play out publicly. Leaving astronauts stranded and potentially with a module stuck on the space station.

Do you definitely start looking for a new job? Assume that ultimately nothing will change?

I wonder sometimes whether NASA should lean into the high risk of spaceflight instead of trying to minimize it. If they could get the public to pay attention, their budgets would go up. Highlighting the risk--without exaggerating--would be a good way to get people to care. People love (maybe even crave) drama.

Astronauts accept an amazing amount of risk, even when using proven systems like Soyuz or Dragon. ISS is one unlucky micrometeoroid strike away from total catastrophe. And yet hundreds of astronaut candidates are jostling with each other (another great drama) to be next on the rocket.

Even uncrewed missions are filled with drama. Imagine devoting 20 years of your scientific career on a probe to Mars and having it blow up on take-off or smash into the Martian surface--so close, and yet so utterly useless.

I think NASA fears that highlighting risk leads to bad press. NASA doesn't want headlines like, "NASA ignores safety concerns--story at 11". But ironically, when NASA minimizes risk, they lower the threshold for how much risk the public will accept. The more they minimize risk, the less risk the public will let them take.

I don't have any good suggestions, though. Highlighting risk inevitably invites the question of "why are we taking the risk at all?" And that's also a hard conversation.

Why is NASA covering for Boeing? Jettison that shit and let it crash into the ocean as a burnt hunk as their infinite hemming and hawing indicates is apparently overwhelmingly likely to happen.

If anyone here's familiar with how these decisions are made, I'm curious about why NASA says they need another week to choose their path forward. Given that we're already over two months into a week-long mission, what information don't they have that they would have in another week?

How is Boeing so consistently terrible nowadays?

Theyre going to kill people at some point.

I don't think anyone should return on Starliner.

Use Dragon, Starliner can be a test.

Do we more or less know how many days worth of supplies they have to keep both up there if needed?

Given alternatives, if the risk cannot be quantified, the risk is too high.

Hopefully NASA hubris does not kill more people like it did during Challenger and Columbia.

Can it fly back unmanned?

As a big SpaceX fan, I appreciate the innovation and success that SpaceX has brought to space exploration. However, it's crucial that we have multiple reliable launch and crew providers to ensure the safety and sustainability of space missions. While SpaceX has been a game-changer, relying solely on one provider is risky. The ongoing issues with Boeing's Starliner highlight the importance of diversity in our space program. We need to support and develop multiple providers to maintain a robust and secure presence in space.

It’s hard enough to get to space even after checking everything twice, now you need to do it on a damaged craft in reverse and you can’t check

Why don't they store a bunch of thrusters at the space station. Sounds like a tool you want to have handy when up there.

What’s wrong with just extending it to next year? Is ISS at capacity? Money/budget issues? NASA reputation?

The only risk returning the capsule unmanned is to their reputation. This is an easy decision.

Didn’t read, you don’t have to based on headline.

They still don’t know root cause(s). That’s real bad Frank.

How did this thing get into space with people in it?

I'm somewhat surprised that, after the SpaceX / Boring Company "rescue submarine" offer a few years ago, Elon Musk hasn't personally suggested (over X, of course) that SpaceX send up another Dragon inside of some compressed timeframe. I'm assuming there must be some other limitations at play - maybe one can't be readied that fast, or there's some other regulatory reason?

I don’t think they’re coming down until after election day. All the money and time devoted to this cannot result in any further failure. It’s an easy narrative for the GOP to spin with themselves as the only party that can beat China in the new space race over the failures the Biden/Harris administration, even if they’re only at arms length through NASA.

its amazing how long the corruption festered before planes started falling out of the sky.

The trade-off here is: When does it become more embarrassing to bring them home in the competitor's vehicle than to extend the mission further.

When in 1974 the 56 day planned mission on Skylab 4 was delayed by 24 days it was a major event.

With the current debacle we are past 65 days of a planned 8 day mission. In a past world this would have been seen as a the shame with the fact in which vessel the crew returned, being a just a minor sidenote.

You can rarely quantify the risk of complex systems. You should instead attempt to bound the risk. This often helps guide your next steps: how can you improve the bounds?

We've seen Elon's companies are more than okay with cutting corners as long as marketing optics look good.

Not saying Boeing is any better, but the culture at his companies seems to be: "Fast dev and fake high quality. Hype it up."