October 15th, 2024

Sysadmins rage over Apple's 'nightmarish' SSL/TLS cert lifespan cuts

Apple proposes reducing SSL/TLS certificate lifespans from 398 days to 45 days by 2027, aiming to enhance security, but system administrators are concerned about increased management workload and automation challenges.

Read original articleLink Icon
Sysadmins rage over Apple's 'nightmarish' SSL/TLS cert lifespan cuts

Apple has proposed a significant reduction in the lifespan of SSL/TLS security certificates, aiming to cut the maximum validity from 398 days to just 45 days by 2027. This proposal, which is set to be voted on by members of the Certification Authority Browser Forum, has sparked strong reactions from system administrators who express concerns over the increased workload associated with managing more frequent certificate renewals. The plan includes a phased approach, reducing the maximum lifespan to 200 days after September 2025, then to 100 days in 2026, and finally to 45 days by April 2027. Additionally, the proposal aims to shorten the domain control validation period to 10 days after September 2027. While shorter certificate lifespans are believed to enhance internet security by limiting the time for potential exploitation, sysadmins worry about the practical implications of managing numerous certificates with such short validity periods. Some have pointed out that automation may not be feasible for all systems, particularly those that require manual certificate management. The proposal follows similar moves by Google, which plans to reduce certificate lifespans in its Chrome browser to 90 days.

- Apple plans to reduce SSL/TLS certificate lifespans from 398 days to 45 days by 2027.

- The proposal is set for a vote among Certification Authority Browser Forum members.

- Shorter certificate lifespans are intended to improve internet security.

- System administrators express concerns over increased management workload.

- Automation may not be a viable solution for all systems requiring SSL certificates.

Related

Sustaining Digital Certificate Security – Entrust Certificate Distrust

Sustaining Digital Certificate Security – Entrust Certificate Distrust

Google's Chrome Security Team distrusts specific Entrust certificates due to reliability concerns. Chrome 127 onwards won't trust certain Entrust TLS server authentication certificates dated after October 31, 2024. Website operators should review certificates for compliance.

Telekom Security: Revocation delay for TLS certificates

Telekom Security: Revocation delay for TLS certificates

Telekom Security experienced a delay in revoking TLS certificates, affecting 336 certificates due to basicConstraints not marked as critical. Efforts were made to prompt customers for replacement within 5 days. Lessons included the need for customer sensitization and faster certificate replacement procedures. Automation via protocols like ACME was considered for future processes. Stakeholders questioned the delay, but Telekom Security defended its decision based on low security risk and impact on critical infrastructures. The incident underscored challenges faced by CAs in ensuring timely revocation and the importance of continuous improvement for industry standards and trust.

Deutsche Telekom issued invalid certificates, hasn't revoked them since 6 months

Deutsche Telekom issued invalid certificates, hasn't revoked them since 6 months

Telekom Security faced delays in revoking TLS certificates, impacting critical infrastructures. Efforts were made to replace 336 certificates within 5 days, highlighting the need for faster procedures and customer sensitization. Mozilla raised concerns about the response, emphasizing the importance of compliance with industry standards.

Google calls for halting use of WHOIS for TLS domain verifications

Google calls for halting use of WHOIS for TLS domain verifications

Google proposed ending the use of WHOIS data for TLS certificate verification due to security vulnerabilities, suggesting a deadline of November 1, 2024, while some advocate for an extension to April 30, 2025.

Avoiding downtime: modern alternatives to outdated certificate pinning practices

Avoiding downtime: modern alternatives to outdated certificate pinning practices

Certificate pinning is becoming obsolete due to frequent certificate rotations causing outages. Modern practices like shorter lifetimes and enhanced monitoring improve security and reduce risks associated with legacy pinning.

Link Icon 9 comments
By @theandrewbailey - 3 months
Is there any reason for a 45 day limit? I was unaware that Let's Encrypt's super long certificate validity period posed such an existential threat to internet security that it needed to be halved.
By @withinboredom - 3 months
I literally ran into a problem with this a few weeks ago. My son didn’t charge his phone for a few days. When he turned it back on, the clock was turned back a few days. He couldn’t change the time manually and he couldn’t sync the clock over WiFi due to apple’s cert not being valid yet. We had to put a SIM card in for a few minutes to get the correct time.
By @erichocean - 3 months
Remember: the most secure device is a device that doesn't work at all.

Thank you SSL/TLS cert lifespan cuts for making this a reality.

Well done, everyone.

By @olliej - 3 months
I was just looking at my comments (which I can no longer edit :-/) and realized they're super/unreasonably mean towards the "sysadmins" from the article.

While yes there are lazy/incompetent sysadmins, there are also lazy/incompetent engineers, marketers, etc this is not a magic sysadmin only thing.

I suspect that in most of the places where their are sysadmins/IT depts in this situation, they've been trying to do something about this for years, while the management of the company has refused to provide the required support or funding for the work because it's not "necessary".

By @ranger207 - 3 months
So a decade from now or so we'll reach the point of every request having its own cert?
By @olliej - 3 months
“Sysadmins rage against basic good practice as has been understood for more than a decade”

If you are unable to roll certificates within a few hours your systems are not set up properly, and you cannot respond appropriately to compromise. The problem with the constant push back of “oh it’s hard to manually perform a certificate update over our services” is fucking stupid and needs to stop. If you cannot roll your certificates regularly without a problem, then I sure as shit doubt you can update your systems in response to an actual urgent issue.

The problem is not onerous rules from Apple, the problem is you’ve spent decades complaining about it being too hard to do basic updates to your services and software, and then every time you get an extension to fix your broken ass systems you go “sweet” and don’t fix the fucking problem.

JFC the incompetence.

By @justinclift - 3 months
Knowing Apple, this will also affect certificates generated using your own SSL root and intermediates as well.

A very uncool thing to do when the application only gets updated about once a year. :(

By @musicale - 3 months
90 minutes/seconds/ms or bust.
By @ChrisArchitect - 3 months