January 3rd, 2025

Let's Encrypt to end OCSP support in 2025

Let's Encrypt will discontinue OCSP support in 2025 due to privacy and performance issues, transitioning to alternative solutions like CRLite, which may disrupt systems relying on OCSP for certificate validation.

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Let's Encrypt to end OCSP support in 2025

Let's Encrypt, the largest Certificate Authority (CA), has announced it will end support for the Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) in 2025. OCSP is used to check if SSL/TLS certificates have been revoked, which is crucial for preventing security breaches. However, Let's Encrypt has identified several issues with OCSP, including privacy concerns, performance delays, and availability problems. When a user visits a website, their browser checks the certificate's status with the CA, potentially leaking browsing activity. Additionally, if the OCSP responder is down, clients may ignore the check, undermining security.

Let's Encrypt's decision follows a history of attempts to improve OCSP, including OCSP Stapling, which mitigates some privacy and performance issues but does not enhance security. The timeline for the transition includes the failure of OCSP Must-Staple requests by January 30, 2025, the removal of OCSP URLs from certificates by May 7, 2025, and the complete shutdown of OCSP responders by August 6, 2025. This change is expected to impact the wider ecosystem, as many systems have relied on OCSP for over a decade. Let's Encrypt aims to redirect resources to more effective solutions for certificate revocation, such as CRLite, which addresses the limitations of current methods.

- Let's Encrypt will end OCSP support in 2025 due to privacy, performance, and availability issues.

- OCSP has been criticized for leaking user browsing data and failing to enhance security.

- The transition will involve specific deadlines for OCSP Must-Staple requests and URL removals.

- Let's Encrypt plans to focus on alternative revocation solutions like CRLite.

- The change may disrupt existing systems that have relied on OCSP for certificate validation.

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By @Its_Padar - 15 days
Wouldn't it be a better idea to use the original blog post direct from Lets Encrypt[1]?

[1] https://letsencrypt.org/2024/12/05/ending-ocsp/?

By @wkat4242 - 15 days
> What do we do if the OCSP Responder is down? Well, it turns out, clients don't really care and they just skip the check and accept the certificate anyway, making the whole thing pointless. OCSP checking add no security!

Don't agree with this statement. It's only adding no security when the CA is down. In case a Cert is revoked and the OCSP is up, it will be blocked.

But I understand their reasons to drop it.

By @OptionOfT - 14 days
I went through a similar journey when trying to figure out how to revoke JWTs, i.e. forcefully sign out everywhere.

We ended up on the following: Either you accept the fact that once signed, it has a life on its own until it expires, or the issuer becomes the single point of failure.

Another issue we dealt with was validating that the person doing the request with a JWT was the owner of the JWT, and not someone who stole it. A possible fix? Distribute private keys to clients, and have them sign the JWTs on the fly. How do you check for revoked private keys? Catch-22.

By @gnabgib - 14 days
Discussion (422 points, 5 months ago, 108 comments) https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=41046956